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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Wrotten'
(decided December 15, 2009)
Juwanna Wrotten was charged with first degree assault and
two counts of first degree robbery. 2 Since the complainant was una-
ble to travel to New York to testify due to his age and health, the
People requested the use of two-way video conferencing.3 The court
granted the request, and Wrotten was later convicted based upon this
testimony.4 The appellate division reversed her conviction based on
the trial court's abuse of authority in allowing such video testimony.
In addition to that issue, the New York Court of Appeals faced the is-
sue of whether the use of two-way video conferencing violated Ju-
wanna Wrotten's Confrontation Clause rights 6 under the United
States and New York Constitutions.7  The court reversed the appel-
late division, reinstated the conviction, and held that the use of live
two-way video testimony was constitutional as the trial court had the
inherent authority to use such a procedure when it was " 'necessary to
further an important public policy' and 'the reliability of the testimo-
ny [was] otherwise assured.' "
In June 2003, Juwanna Wrotten, acting as a home health aide
(Wrotten III), 923 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2009).
2 Id. at 1100.
Id. at I101. Prior to the trial, the People asked the court to grant a conditional examina-
tion of the complainant in California where he was presently living. However, this was una-
ble to occur because Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) Article 660 required the examination to
take place in New York. Id at 1100-01.
4 Id. at 1101.
5 Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1101 (citing People v. Wrotten (Wrotten II), 871 N.Y.S.2d
28, 44 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008)).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ."); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In any
trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be . . . confronted with the witnesses
against him or her.").
7 WrottenlII,923N.E.2dat 1103.
8 Id. at 1102-03 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990)).
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for the complainant's wife, was assisting the elderly man in preparing
food to take to his wife who had just begun living in a nursing home.9
At eighty-three years old, the man had difficulty walking and a histo-
ry of coronary heart disease.'o According to the complainant, while
he was preparing the food, Wrotten came up from behind him, hit
him in the head with a hammer, and forced him to give her money."
With no one else around, it was the man's word alone against the
home health aide's. Wrotten, however, claimed she hit him with "
'something' only after he grabbed her breast." 12 She denied asking
for or receiving money." The man was left with head wounds and
broken fingers. 14
Due to the incident, he moved to California, which was where
his children resided." Since he was unable to travel to New York to
testify, the People requested the use of two-way video conferencing
to allow the complainant to testify from California.16 The trial court
granted the request with the requirements that the conferencing occur
live at the trial and that they show the complainant's inability to tra-
vel to New York.'7 In the subsequent hearing regarding his inability
to travel, the trial court ruled that the complainant's weakness, prob-
lems walking, and history of coronary heart disease not only rendered
him unable to travel to New York, but would further endanger his
health if he was required to do so." At trial, the complainant testi-
fied in a courtroom in California using the two-way video.' 9 The
complainant was able to see the defendant, the defendant's counsel,
the prosecutor, the judge, and the jury on the screen.20 In addition,
the complainant and his facial expressions were "very clearly" visible
on the screen live during the trial. 2' Subsequently, Juwanna Wrotten
Id. at 1100.
10 Id. at 1100-01.
" Id. at 1100.
12 Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1100.
13 Id.
14 id
15 Id
6 Id at 1101.
" Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1101.
18 id
19 Id
20 id
21 id
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was convicted of assault but acquitted of the robbery charges.22 On
appeal, the appellate division reversed her conviction, finding that the
trial court lacked the express authority to allow the complainant to
testify by two-way video, thus avoiding the Confrontation Clause is-
sue.23
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held that the trial
court's exercise of authority allowing video testimony was permissib-
le24 and that such use did not violate Juwanna Wrotten's Confronta-
tion Clause rights under either the United States or New York Consti-
tutions.25 After establishing that the trial court had the authority to
allow the use of two-way video testimony, the court needed to deter-
mine whether the exercise of this authority given the facts of the case
was constitutionally permissible.26 To determine whether use of the
two-way video was permissible under the Federal Constitution, the
court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mary-
land v. Craig.27 In Craig, the Court stated that "a defendant's right to
confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical,
face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confron-
tation is necessary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." 2 8  The
New York Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Craig to
the facts in Wrotten and found that a necessary public policy was
present and that the reliability of the testimony was assured.29
22 WrottenlII,923N.E.2dat 1101.
23 Id. (citing Wrotten II, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 44).
24 Id. at 1102. In analyzing whether or not the trial court had the authority to allow the use
of two-way video testimony, the New York Court of Appeals looked to the New York Con-
stitution and the Judiciary Law. The court found that " 'the Constitution permits the courts
latitude to adopt procedures consistent with general practice as provided by statute,' " and
section 2-b of the Judiciary Law vests courts with the authority to use "innovative proce-
dures where 'necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by [the
court].' " Id. at 1101 (quoting People v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1338 (N.Y. 1989)).
25 Id. at 1102.
26 Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1102.
27 Id. (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 850).
28 Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988)).
29 Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1103. Although the New York Court of Appeals remanded
the case back to the appellate division to determine whether the findings of fact were sup-
ported by clear and convincing evidence, the court stated that if they were, then the necessity
requirement was satisfied. Id. The public policy raised by the complainant's physical condi-
tion meets the necessary public policy required by the standard. Id. On remand, the appel-
late division held that the supreme court did not err in finding that the complainant's inabili-
ty to travel to the courthouse without putting his health in danger was proven by clear and
2011] 787
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The New York Court of Appeals first looked to the Court's
opinion in Craig to determine how to measure whether the reliability
of the testimony was assured where the witness was absent from the
courtroom.30  Craig held that the reliability of the testimony is as-
sured by preserving the "traditional indicia of reliability": "testimony
under oath, the opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination,
and the opportunity for the judge, jury, and defendant to view the
witness's demeanor as he or she testifies."3 1 In applying this test to
the facts in Wrotten, the court found that the two-way video pre-
served all three elements essential to assuring the reliability of the
testimony.32 The complainant testified under oath, was contempora-
neously cross-examined, and was able to be viewed clearly by the
judge, jury, and defendant.33
Without Supreme Court precedent directly stating whether the
situation of a "key witness too ill to appear in court" raised an impor-
tant public policy, the New York Court of Appeals interpreted the
lack of clarification to mean that such a finding was possible and
supported its holding by referring to other federal and state courts
that have permitted video testimony under the same circumstances.34
The court held that "the public policy of justly resolving criminal
cases while at the same time protecting the well-being of a witness"
was an important public policy that necessitates the use of two-way
video testimony.35  However, the court limited its holding to situa-
tions "where a key witness cannot physically travel to court in New
York and where, as here, defendant's confrontation rights have been
minimally impaired."36  While making its determination, the court
acknowledged that two-way video conferencing was not the same as
convincing evidence. People v. Wrotten (Wrotten 1), 901 N.Y.S.2d 265, 265 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 2010). The appellate division also held that the complainant was a key witness and
therefore met the requirements set forth by the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 266. The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari due to procedural difficulties based on the
interlocutory posture of the case. Wrotten v. New York (Wrotten IV), 130 S. Ct. 2520, 2520
(2010).
30 See Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1102.
* Id. at 1102-03 (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 851).
32 Id. at 1103.
" See id.
34 id.
3s Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1103.
36 Id. (emphasis added).
788 [Vol. 27
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giving face-to-face testimony. The court further limited its holding
by saying that "the decision to excuse a witness's presence in the
courtroom should be weighed carefully," and used only where there
is a "case-specific finding of necessity." 38 Finding both assurance of
reliable testimony and the necessity to further an important public
policy, the New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court's de-
cision to allow the use of two-way video testimony satisfied the Fed-
eral Confrontation Clause.39
The right to confrontation applies not only in federal proceed-
ings, but state proceedings as well.4 0 In determining whether Juwan-
na Wrotten's Confrontation Clause rights were violated under the
New York Constitution, the New York Court of Appeals briefly men-
tioned its decision in People v. Cintron.4 1 In Cintron, the court held
that use of closed-circuit television does not violate the New York
Constitution where "(1) an appropriate individualized showing of ne-
cessity is made and (2) the infringement on defendant's confrontation
rights is kept to a minimum." 42 Since the federal and state standards
have been treated as the same,43 although worded slightly differently,
the New York Court of Appeals avoided a separate state analysis and
permitted the federal analysis to satisfy both Confrontation Clauses.'
Disagreeing with the majority's reasoning, Justice Smith took
the position that Juwanna Wrotten's rights were violated under both
37 id.
38 Id.
3 Id. at 1100.
40 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (holding that the Confrontation Clause ap-
plies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
41 551 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 1990).
42 Id. at 567 (forbidding the use of two-way video conferencing to allow a child vic-
tim/witness in a sexual abuse case to testify without being in the courtroom due to an insuffi-
cient showing of vulnerability on the part of the child).
43 The difference in the wording of the state standard was not an intentional departure
from the federal standard, but rather due to the fact that Cintron was decided five months
before the federal standard was announced in Craig. The state standard is used interchange-
ably with that of the federal. See Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1106-07 (Smith J., dissenting).
That conclusion does not resolve the case, because we held in
People v. Cintron and the United States Supreme Court held in Mary-
land v. Craig, that the right of face to face confrontation is not absolute,
and may be denied where "an appropriate individualized showing of ne-
cessity is made"-or, as the Supreme Court put it, where "denial of such
confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
4 Id. at 1102 (majority opinion).
2011] 789
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the Federal and State Constitutions. 45  The dissent argued that the
right to confrontation encompassed one's right "to meet one's accus-
er face to face," with such face-to-face confrontation bringing with it
a psychological effect that is likely to deter the witness from making
false accusations. 4 6 Justice Smith stated, "The assumption underly-
ing the constitutional right of confrontation is that a witness brought
into the presence of the accused will be less likely to swear to a false
accusation, or to do so convincingly."47
According to Justice Smith, the necessity and public policy
involved in protecting vulnerable child witnesses who have been sex-
ually assaulted and have no other way to avoid the trauma was "far
more compelling" than the necessity in protecting the health of an el-
derly witness who did have another way to avoid the harm.4 8 In cas-
es regarding children testifying about sexual abuse, the harm is di-
rectly caused by the face-to-face confrontation making it reasonable
to remove the face-to-face aspect. 49 However, the harm attempting to
be avoided in Wrotten was not directly caused by the face-to-face as-
pect.o The face-to-face aspect could have been maintained by the
use of alternative options, such as bringing the accused to California
to confront the complainant. 5 ' Although this is a valid argument, this
alternative was not available under New York's statutes.52
The right to confrontation is an "essential and fundamental"
part of a fair trial.53 The Supreme Court has held that the right to
45 See id. at 1106 (Smith, J., dissenting). Justice Jones also dissented. In his dissenting
opinion, he avoided the constitutional issues and based his argument on the fact that there
was nothing that expressly authorized the court to use two-way video conferencing. Id. at
1103 (Jones, J., dissenting). By specifically articulating the requirements to use the technol-
ogy in child sexual abuse cases, the legislature demonstrated its intent to not have it apply in
circumstances not listed. Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1104.
46 Id. at 1106 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016, 1019).
47 Id. (citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019).
48 Id. at 1107.
49 id
50 See Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1107.
52 Id. at 1100-01 (majority opinion) ("CPL article 660 requires that the examination be
conducted in New York State and complainant was unable to travel.").
53 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405. The importance of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause was articulately explained by Justice Black, when he stated: "There are few subjects,
perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in
their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essen-
tial and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitu-
tional goal." Id.
790 [Vol. 27
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confrontation is a "fundamental right," that the right applies to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 54 and that the "main and essential purpose" of the Confronta-
tion Clause is cross-examination." In 1988, in Coy v. lowa,56 the
Court held that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a
face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact."" However, two years later, in Craig, the Court held that the
right to confrontation was not absolute.5 8 In Craig, the Court recog-
nized an exception to the face-to-face requirement for a child victim
in a sexual abuse case and other child witnesses allegedly abused by
the defendant that would suffer "trauma that would be caused by tes-
tifying in the physical presence of the defendant."5 9 It reasoned that
previous precedent merely " 'reflect[ed] a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial,' 6 0 [which must yield to] . . . 'public policy and
the necessities of the [specific] case.' ,61 The Confrontation Clause
can be satisfied without face-to-face confrontation when it is "neces-
sary to further an important public policy and only where the reliabil-
ity of the testimony is otherwise assured." 62  In Craig, the Court
found that the one-way video assured the reliability of the testimony
by preserving the traditional indicia of reliability previously men-
tioned.63 The children were capable of testifying, testified under
oath, were contemporaneously cross-examined, "and were able to be
[viewed] by the judge, jury, and defendant [while] they testified."64
The Court also concluded that "a State's interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to
face his or her accusers in court."65 The Court limited its holding by
54 Id. at 403.
55 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)).
56 487 U.S. 1012.
5 Id. at 1016 (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 749-50 (1987) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting)).
1 Craig, 497 U.S. at 844.
59 Id. at 857.
6 Id. at 849 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 488 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
61 Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
62 Id. at 850 (citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021).
61 Craig, 497 U.S. at 851.
6 Id. at 857.
65 Id. at 853.
2011] 791
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requiring that the procedure be "necessary to protect the welfare of
the particular child witness who seeks to testify" and that "the child
witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by
the presence of the defendant." 66
An exception to in-person confrontation has also been ap-
plied, on multiple occasions, where a key witness was too sick to tra-
vel.67 In United States v. Gigante,68 the Second Circuit held that the
defendant's confrontation rights were not violated when the trial
court allowed the key witness, who was in "the final stages of an in-
operable, fatal cancer," to testify using two-way, closed circuit tele-
vised testimony.69 After the government requested the use of closed-
circuit television for the witness to testify, the trial court "held a hear-
ing to determine whether [the witness] was [physically] [un]able to
travel to New York."7 0 Expert testimony showed that it would be un-
safe for him to travel in regards to his health.7 ' Although an oncolo-
gist for the defendant testified that "it would not be life-threatening"
for the witness to travel, the trial court nevertheless held in favor of
the government.72 In rendering its decision, the court showed that the
reliability of the testimony was assured by the fact that the witness
still testified under oath, was cross-examined, was viewed through
the television by all courtroom participants so that his demeanor
could be observed, and was under the eye of the defendant himself. 7
The court did not put forth an important public policy furthering the
use of the video in Gigante, but rather distinguished Gigante from
Craig.74 According to the court, the Craig standard, requiring relia-
bility and necessity, did not apply because it was created to apply to
66 Id. at 855-56 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-09
(1982)).
67 Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 310 (5th Cir. 2007) (permitting use of two-way tes-
timony by prosecution's witness who was in the terminal stages of cancer); United States v.
Benson, 79 Fed. Appx. 813, 821 (6th Cir. 2003) (permitting use of two-way testimony by an
elderly witness who testified to being underweight and fatigued after recently undergoing
surgery); United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (permitting use of two-
way testimony by a crucial witness who was in the terminal stages of cancer).
68 166 F.3d 75.
69 Id. at 79.
70 id
71 Id.
72 Id. at 79-80.
7 Gigante, 166 F.3d at 80.
74 Id. at 80-81.
792 [Vol. 27
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the use of 'one-way' closed circuit television in which the witness
could not view the defendant." In Gigante, the means used for the
witness to testify was 'two-way' closed circuit television, which re-
quires the witness to view the defendant.7 6 The two-way system pre-
served the face-to-face confrontation, since the witness and defendant
were still looking at each other's face as the witness testified.7 7 Last-
ly, the court acknowledged that deposing the witness was an availa-
ble option but agreed with the district court that " 'contemporaneous
testimony via closed circuit televising affords greater protection of . .
. confrontation rights than would a deposition,' " because the tran-
script alone would not have allowed the witness' demeanor to be ob-
served.78
The Southern District Court of New York recently applied
this established standard to a unique factual scenario in United States
v. Banki.7 9 In Banki, the defendant was charged with violating the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, by illegally operat-
ing a value transfer system in which he and other co-conspirators
transferred money from the United States to Iran.80 In his defense,
Banki alleged that the money he received from Iran was merely a gift
from his relatives to purchase an apartment in New York City.8'
Banki sought to introduce testimony from his relatives presently liv-
ing in Iran and the family's broker who arranged the transfer. 82 Al-
though some of his relatives were United States citizens, they were
reluctant to come back to the United States to testify fearing they too
would be arrested as co-conspirators.83 Banki tried to arrange an
agreement to have the witnesses come to New York if they could
trust that they would not be arrested, but the government refused to
enter such an agreement.84 Banki then requested that the proposed
witnesses be allowed to testify at trial from Iran through the use of
" Id. at 8 1.
76 Id.
n Id.
78 Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81 (quoting United States v. Gigante, 971 F. Supp. 755, 759
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)).
7 No. 10CRO8 (JFK), 2010 WL 1063453, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2010).
so id.
81 Id.
82 id
83 Id.
8 Banki, 2010 WL 1063453, at *1.
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live video conferencing." In making its decision, the court acknowl-
edged that this situation differed from prevailing precedent, in that
the defendant, not the government, was requesting use of the video
conferencing.8 6 One's Confrontation Clause rights are not implicated
when the defendant, as opposed to the government, is making the re-
quest. 87
Nevertheless, the court applied the standard from Craig and
Gigante, because the court lacked directly applicable precedent for
such a request by a defendant and the issue presented similar consid-
erations regarding the integrity of the proceedings. In applying the
standard, the court denied the defendant's request because the second
element-that the reliability of the testimony be otherwise as-
sured-would not be satisfied by using video testimony in that case.
Although the witnesses would be under oath, the court could not en-
sure the reliability of the testimony, as the government could not
prosecute them for perjury because they were beyond the reach of the
United States government.90 Although the defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights were not implicated in Banki, the case raised the point
that the use of video testimony can benefit both the prosecution and
the defense.
The law regarding the Confrontation Clause is the same under
the New York Constitution and the United States Constitution.91 The
85 id
8 Id. at *2.
87 id
88 id
89 Banki, 2010 WL 1063453, at *2.
90 Id
91 While the New York approach explicitly states that an individualized showing is re-
quired and the defendant's confrontation rights must be minimally infringed, both of these
requirements are addressed in Craig as being part of the federal approach. See Craig, 497
U.S. at 855 (stating that the necessity must be specific to the witness in particular); id at
845-46 (noting that the indicia of reliability, as explicitly required in the federal approach,
are what make up a defendant's confrontation rights). While the federal approach explicitly
states that there must be an important public policy and the testimony's reliability must be
assured, both of these requirements are addressed in Cintron as being part of the New York
approach. See Cintron, 551 N.E.2d at 567 (noting that the standard is meant to apply when
"a defendant's rights of confrontation 'must occasionally give way to considerations of pub-
lic policy' " (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243)); id at 567-69 (noting that the New York re-
quirement that a defendant's confrontation rights be minimally infringed is guaranteed by the
indicia of reliability which assure the reliability of the testimony); see also Wrotten III, 923
N.E.2d at 1106 (Smith, J. dissenting) ("I assume here that the content of the state and federal
rights is the same; I know of no authority holding otherwise.").
[Vol. 27794
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New York Court of Appeals allows for "the use of closed-circuit tel-
evision technology where: (1) an appropriate individualized showing
of necessity is made and (2) the infringement on defendant's confron-
tation rights is kept to a minimum." 92 Although worded differently,
this approach is equivalent to the federal approach, allowing the ab-
sence of face to face confrontation when "necessary to further an im-
portant public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony
is otherwise assured."93 The test simply comes down to necessity
and reliability.
Similar to the federal precedent, New York State courts have
also long acknowledged the importance of one's right to confronta-
tion. In 1896, in People v. Kraft,94 the New York Court of Appeals
stated, "The power of cross-examination is quite as essential, in the
process of eliciting the truth, as the obligation of an oath; and where
the life or the liberty of the defendant is at stake the absence of the
* * 95opportunity for cross-examination is a serious deprivation ....
In Cintron, the trial court permitted the use of two-way video
conferencing to allow a child victim in a child sexual abuse case to
testify without being in the courtroom. 96 Although the court ulti-
mately concluded that the trial court erred in allowing the procedure
in that specific case, on the basis that there was insufficient evidence
of vulnerability on the part of the child, the court held that use of
closed-circuit televised testimony is permitted where "(1) an appro-
priate individualized showing of necessity is made and (2) the in-
fringement on defendant's confrontation rights is kept to a mini-
mum."97  According to the court in Cintron, the "face-to-face
confrontation with the defendant is not an absolute requirement under
either the Federal or State Constitution."98 The court believed neces-
sity existed if face-to-face contact with the defendant would lead to
"severe mental or emotional harm" to the witness.99 Having differ-
ent facts but similar reasoning, the court in Wrotten believed necessi-
ty existed because forcing the witness to relocate would lead to se-
92 Cintron, 551 N.E.2d at 567.
9 Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 (quoting Roberts, 488 U.S. at 64).
94 43 N.E. 80 (N.Y. 1896).
"Id. at 80-81.
96 Cintron, 551 N.E.2d at 563.
97Id. at 567.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
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vere physical harm to the witness based on his deteriorating health.'00
In People v. Henderson,'0 ' which was decided three months
after Cintron, the court held that the first element-an individualized
showing of necessity-was not satisfied when the trial court allowed
two sexually abused children to testify using two-way closed-circuit
television.102 The court in Henderson held that the difficulty for sex-
ually abused children to testify in the same room as their abuser was
not enough to rise to the level of exceptional circumstances that war-
ranted the use of the two-way video.'0o To rise to this level, it must
be shown that the children would suffer "further and severe mental or
emotional harm" (in addition to the harm they already have from the
abuse) by being denied the ability to use the two-way closed-circuit
television.104 Finding it to be a "very frightening experience" is not
enough. 05 Although the court acknowledged the trauma experienced
by children who are sexually abused, the court forcefully stated that
the "inestimable importance of face-to-face confrontation" should
make the use of such technology the "exception, and not the rule." 06
While the precedent on the use of video conferencing in child
sexual abuse cases is abundant,'0 7 the issue of using video conferenc-
ing in other circumstances has arisen more recently for state courts.
In 2006, in In re A. Sawyer, 0 8 the Supreme Court of Oneida County
allowed a physician to use video conferencing to testify.109 The court
supported its decision by noting that "[p]hysicians' schedules are
hectic, live appearances by them are costly to the parties, the physi-
cian, and the health care system overall.""o Similar to Gigante, the
court also acknowledged the available option of using a video deposi-
" See Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1101.
'0 554 N.Y.S.2d 924 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990).
102 Id. at 927.
103 Id. at 928.
104 Id.
1os Id. (citing Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987) (finding that the psy-
chologist's testimony that it would be very frightening for the child to testify in the same
room as the defendant was not enough to permit the child to testify in a separate room)).
106 Henderson, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
1o7 Cathleen J. Cinella, Compromising the Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation-
United States v. Gigante, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 135, 159 (1998) (noting that courts fre-
quently use the Confrontation Clause exception in child abuse cases).
los 823 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
0 Id. at 646.
"o Id. at 645.
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tion."' The court concluded that use of video conferencing was su-
perior in that it allowed the witness to testify "in real time" allowing
the judge the ability to immediately rule on objections.1 1 2
The New York Court of Appeal's decision in Wrotten was
consistent with both federal and state precedent. Instead of changing
the law, the court merely extended when closed circuit technology
could be used. Regardless of the number of cases consistent with the
approach taken in Wrotten, opposition exists to extending the cir-
cumstances in which closed circuit television can be used.11 3 While
some recognize the benefits of using this new technology,114 others
stand by the strict belief that the Confrontation Clause "guarantees a
defendant the right to meet his or her accusers face-to-face before the
trier of fact.""' 5  In Henderson, the court stood by the position that
the right to confront one's accuser face-to-face " 'may confound and
undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent
adult.' "116
Contrary to this position, courts should follow the Wrotten
decision and allow two-way closed circuit television to be used in
cases where a key witness is physically unable to travel due to health
concerns. First, the Confrontation Clause should be interpreted in
112 id.
113 See Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993). Judge Meritt emphasized
the importance of a witness testifying first hand, face-to-face with the accused by stating:
In the most important affairs of life, people approach each other in per-
son, and television is no substitute for direct personal contact. Video
tape is still a picture, not a life, and it does not come within the rule of
the confrontation clause which insists on real life where possible, not
simply a close approximation.
Id.
114 Hadley Perry, Virtually Face-to-Face: The Confrontation Clause and the Use of Two-
Way Video Testimony, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 565, 592-93 (2008) (stating that
"[tihe procedure is convenient, cost-effective, efficient, and comports with modem notions
of globalization and technological advancements," "it provides a better alternative for ob-
taining foreign witness testimony," and that even "studies have found that jurors respond the
same to live witnesses as those testifying via video conference").
115 Henderson, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 927; see also United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1315
(llth Cir. 2006) ("The simple truth is that confrontation through a video monitor is not the
same as physical face-to-face confrontation.").
116 Henderson, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020). Contra Craig, 497
U.S. at 851 (arguing that the traditional indicia of reliability permit a defendant to "'con-
found and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult' "(quot-
ing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020)).
2011] 797
13
O'Dette: Court of Appeals of New York: People v. Wrotten
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011
TOURO LAWREVIEW
light of modem technology. As long as the defendant's right to
cross-examine his accuser and the indicia of reliable testimony are
preserved, courts should embrace the benefits that such technology
can bring. Second, the use of such technology in circumstances
where the witness is the sole witness to the crime, as was the case in
Wrotten, resolves similar problems as those that arise in child abuse
cases. Lastly, use of such technology is consistent with the true pur-
pose of the Confrontation Clause and does not detract from the truth-
seeking purpose of the trial process.
First, the Confrontation Clause should be interpreted in light
of modem technology. As declared in People v. Algarin,'"7 the Con-
frontation Clause creates a " 'secured right of cross-examination' "
and only a " 'preference of face-to-face confrontation.' ",18 "[T]he
confrontation guaranteed by the clause is not necessarily one in a
courtroom."" 9 Before the availability of television, confrontation re-
quired a face-to-face meeting.'20 However, in modem times, this
language has been said to refer to a right of cross-examination rather
than a right to a physical face-to-face meeting.' 2 ' The lack of clarity
in the clause has been attributed to the "inability to foresee technolo-
gical developments permitting cross-examination and confrontation
without physical presence." 22 This belief, that the right to confronta-
tion is actually meant to be a right to cross-examination, has been ac-
knowledged by the United States Supreme Court itself: "[T]he Con-
frontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a
full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through
cross-examination ....
..7 498 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
"1 Id at 981 (quoting State v. Washington, 494 A.2d 335, 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1985)).
119 Id (quoting Washington, 494 A.2d at 337).
120 id
121 id
122 Algarin, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
123 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985); see also Stincer, 482 U.S. at 744 n.17
(majority opinion) (stating that to determine whether or not one's right to confrontation has
been violated, "[t]he appropriate question is whether there has been any interference with the
defendant's opportunity for effective cross-examination"); 5 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397, at 158 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) ("There
never was at common law any recognized right to an indispensable thing called confronta-
tion as distinguished from cross-examination. There was a right to cross-examination as in-
dispensable, and that right was involved in and secured by confrontation; it was the same
right under different names.").
[Vol. 27798
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Second, the use of live video testimony in Wrotten furthers
similar purposes as in child sexual abuse cases. Most states have
created statutes permitting the use of two-way testimony in child sex-
ual abuse cases because of the difficulty in prosecuting a crime when
there are no witnesses other than the victim, and the victim is either
unable or reluctant to testify. 124 In Wrotten, the victim was the only
witness to the crime and his inability to return to the state should not
justify losing his chance to testify. Unlike cases where there will be
testimony but with the possibility of being distorted due to intimida-
tion, in situations where a key witness is physically unable to travel to
the courthouse to testify, prohibiting the use of live video testimony
means the witness' testimony will not occur at all.125 Without the
testimony of a "key" witness, especially when he or she is the sole
witness to the crime, the court has not only compromised the truth-
seeking purpose but completely closed off the opportunity for the
truth to come in.
Courts fear where the line will be drawn-what constitutes
"necessity"-if they permit the use of this technology outside of child
abuse crimes.126 Necessity may warrant use of such technology by
someone who is fatally ill or disabled, but does it warrant use by one
who resides across the country and is just too busy to travel to the
state to testify? If the variety of circumstances becomes too broad,
how far is it before the validity of the Confrontation Clause is
eroded? Although the line remains to be drawn, the line should en-
compass crimes in which the person using the technology is a key
witness to the incident and physically unable to travel to the court-
house. The need to preserve key testimony and to protect the witness
from risking his health to testify clearly constitutes "necessity."l 27
124 In re Noel 0., 855 N.Y.S.2d 318, 322 (Fam. Ct. 2008).
125 See J. Steven Beckett & Steven D. Stennett, The Elder Witness-The Admissibility of
Closed Circuit Television Testimony after Maryland v. Craig, 7 ELDER L.J. 313, 314 (1999)
("The witness could be declared unavailable and deposed, but depositions are used rarely in
criminal cases and live testimony is considered much more effective in convincing a jury.");
see also Wrotten 1H1, 923 N.E.2d at 1100-01 (noting that Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) Ar-
ticle 660 requires depositions to take place in New York, and therefore would leave a wit-
ness unable to travel to New York without any options).
126 See Ralph H. Kohlmann, The Presumption of Innocence: Patching the Tattered Cloak
after Maryland v. Craig, 27 ST. MARY's L.J. 389, 405 (1996) ("Now that the constitutional
dam concerning face-to-face confrontation has been broken, it is difficult to predict with any
certainty where the river of logical extension will flow.").
127 See Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1103 (finding that the "public policy of justly resolving
7992011]
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Juwanna Wrotten put her elderly victim's health at risk when she as-
saulted him with a hammer. He should not have to be re-victimized
by further risking his health in order to testify.
Further, in cases where this witness is the accuser, it actually
gives the defendant access to his accuser which he otherwise would
not have since the accuser is unable to travel to the courthouse.128
Permitting the use of this technology in such situations would further
the defendant's ability to confront his accuser rather than limit it,
since no confrontation would occur at all if the technology was not
permitted.129  Permitting the use of two-way testimony would also
benefit defendants who are charged with a crime they did not com-
mit, and the only person who was able to observe who actually com-
mitted the crime is physically unable to travel to the courthouse.130
Although this example does not implement one's Confrontation
Clause rights because the defendant is seeking the use of the technol-
ogy, as was the case in Banki, it illustrates the necessity of using
closed-circuit television and the fact that its use furthers the truth-
seeking process for both the prosecution and the defense.' 3 '
Lastly, while many scholars will cling to the fact that without
face-to-face confrontation the psychological effect it creates is lost, it
is questionable whether that psychological effect is essential to the
truth-seeking process.132 The true purpose of the adversarial process
criminal cases while at the same time protecting the well-being of a witness" is an important
public policy that necessitates the use of two-way video testimony). The necessity of pre-
serving key testimony and protecting the physical health of the witness is further proven by
the fact that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a rule to do just that. Rule 15
allows for the use of depositions when the witness is unavailable. FED R. CRIM. P. 15. Un-
availability is defined under the Federal Rules of Evidence and includes situations where a
witness "is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of .. . physical or mental
illness or infirmity." FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(4).
128 Beckett & Stennett, supra note 125, at 314 (proposing that a rule should be adopted
that would allow the use of closed-circuit television for the elderly and the disabled to testify
and that such a rule "affords and anticipates equal access by criminal defendants to such
elder witnesses").
129 See id at 314, 333.
130 Id. at 315.
'13 Id. at 316.
132 See Gail D. Cecchettini-Whaley, Children as Witnesses after Maryland v. Craig, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1993, 2036 (1992) ("[E]vidence regarding whether face-to-face confrontation
actually enhances reliability of testimony and encourages truth telling is needed. If face-to-
face confrontation does not produce more-reliable evidence, further research must determine
whether the symbolic value of face-to-face confrontation to the defendant and to our legal
system is worth preserving . . . .").
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is to seek the truth, 133 not to intimidate. 134  It has been repeatedly
stated by the opposition that physical face-to-face confrontation is
necessary to seek the truth.135 However, the cross-examination of the
witness brings out the truth,136 not the face-to-face aspect.'3 7  In
Craig, Justice O'Connor stated that cross-examination " 'expose[s]
testimonial infirmities such as forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion . .
. calling to the attention of the factfinder [sic] the reasons for giving
scant weight to the witness' testimony.' "' In addition, making it
possible for a key witness to testify, who otherwise would not be
133 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) ("The basic purpose of a
trial is the determination of truth .... ).
1' See Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (noting that confrontation was not for the "idle purpose of
gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him" (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1395, at 123)); see also Lisa R. Miller, Constitutional Law-Confrontation Clause-
Allowing a Child Abuse Victim to Testify via One-way Closed-circuit Television Does Not
Violate a Criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause Right if the Trial
Court Specifically Finds Such a Procedure Necessary to Protect the Child's Welfare, 22 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 555, 573-74 (1990). The article explains that intimidation is not the intended
purpose of the Confrontation Clause by stating:
[C]losed-circuit television procedure provides great protection for the
child while depriving the defendant only whatever advantage he might
have gained through intimidation of the testifying child. Such an advan-
tage, however, is neither within the intended purpose of the confronta-
tion clause, nor does it justify risking the emotional health of the child.
Id.
'. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019 ("It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his
face' than 'behind his back.' "); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 375-76 (1956) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (stating that a witness "may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story
looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts"); Cinella,
supra note 107, at 156 ("Face-to-face confrontation plays an essential role in this process by
reducing the possibility that a witness will lie on the stand.").
131 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404 ("[C]ertainly no one experienced in the trial of lawsuits,
would deny the value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth
in the trial of a criminal case."); see also Josephine Ross, What's Reliability Got to Do with
the Confrontation Clause after Crawford?, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 383, 392 (2009) ("It is
cross-examination, much more than face-to-face accusation, that is the fundamental way the
Confrontation Clause functions in the modem trial."). The article goes on to note that
"cross-examination is a means to get to the truth." Id.
137 "Witness intimidation is often the reason why a witness's testimony at trial is contrary
or contradictory to that witness's earlier statements to the police." Joan Comparet-Cassani,
Balancing the Anonymity of Threatened Witnesses Versus a Defendant's Right of Confronta-
tion: The Waiver Doctrine after Alvarado, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1165, 1200 (2002) (de-
scribing a case in which the defendant's brother sat in the courtroom glaring at the witnesses
which subsequently led the witnesses to recant their earlier testimony and deny the state-
ments they had given to police).
' Craig, 497 U.S. at 847 (quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 22).
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able, furthers the goal of seeking the truth.139  Facing one's accuser
face-to-face furthers the goal of intimidation.140
The reason why courts allow limitations on one's Confronta-
tion Clause rights, such as using closed circuit television to testify, is
to guarantee the truthfulness of the testimony.141 If the truthfulness
of the testimony is ensured by not adhering to strict face-to-face con-
frontation, then adhering to face-to-face confrontation must compro-
mise the truth in some way.142 Justice O'Connor acknowledged this
in Craig when she stated, "Indeed, where face-to-face confrontation
causes significant emotional distress in a child witness, there is evi-
dence that such confrontation would in fact disserve the Confronta-
tion Clause's truth-seeking goal." 43
Although the distress created by face-to-face confrontation
with the defendant has most commonly been acknowledged in child
sexual abuse cases, it is not unique to child abuse victims. 144 Face-
139 Christine L. Olson, Accusations from Abroad: Testimony of Unavailable Witnesses via
Live Two-way Videoconferencing Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1671, 1698 (2008) (stating that two-way video testimo-
ny of unavailable witnesses "is necessary to further the important public policy of providing
the fact-finder with truthful testimony").
140 See Wrotten III, 923 N.E.2d at 1106 (Smith, J., dissenting) (describing the psychologi-
cal effect face-to-face confrontation has on a witness); John A. Mayers, Coy v. Iowa: A Con-
stitutional Right of Intimidation, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 709, 713 (1989) (arguing that the Right to
Face-to-face Confrontation is really just a Right of Intimidation); see also John Paul Serke-
tich, A Conflict of Interests: The Constitutionality of Closed-circuit Television in Child Sex-
ual Abuse Cases, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 217, 233-34 (1992) (noting that "face-to-face confron-
tation may inhibit the victim from pressing charges").
141 See Alanna Clair, An Opportunity for Effective Cross-examination: Limits on the Con-
frontation Right of the Pro Se Defendant, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 719, 732 (2009) ("The
limitations on a defendant's strict constitutional right to confront his accusers are most often
justified by the court's desire to ensure truthful and unencumbered testimony.").
142 See id.
143 Craig, 497 U.S. at 857 (citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1032).
144 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020 ("[F]ace-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the
truthful rape victim . . . ."); see also United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 817 (8th Cir.
1979) (denying the request by an adult woman, who was the victim of a kidnapping, to pro-
vide a videotaped deposition instead of testifying at trial because of her fear of being in the
same room as the defendant); Clair, supra note 141, at 719 (recognizing the use of intimida-
tion by a defendant on surviving victims of invasive crimes, such as rape, kidnapping, and
assault); Nora V. Demieitner, Witness Protection in Criminal Cases: Anonymity, Disguise or
Other Options?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 644 (1998) ("[W]itness intimidation has become a
more publicized issue in cases of domestic abuse."); Kohlmann, supra note 126, at 404.
After all, if Craig essentially allows the state to protect a class of wit-
nesses from the trauma of testifying in the presence of the accused upon
a showing of necessity, it follows that an argument for necessity could
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to-face confrontation, forcing the victim to sit a short distance from
the perpetrator who victimized them, can hinder the truth-seeking
process by deterring victims from testifying because it increases the
fear of being further retaliated against either by the defendant if set
free, 145 or if not, by his friends and family on the outside.14 6 In some
cases, it even deters one from reporting the incident to begin with.147
"[T]he Confrontation Clause serves two distinct purposes:
first and primarily, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination
and secondarily, to enable a jury to observe a witness' demeanor
when brought face to face with the accused." 48  Bringing a witness
face to face with the accused was a method used to "enable a jury to
observe a witness' demeanor."'l 4 9  Bringing a witness face to face
with the accused was not a purpose within itself'50 and should not be
made one by a defendant's desire to intimidate his witnesses. As the
Supreme Court has said,
"The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to
secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination. The opponent demands confrontation,
not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or
of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of
cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the
direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining
be persuasively asserted on behalf of rape victims, victims of vicious as-
saults, or elderly victims.
Id.
145 See PETER FINN, USING CIVIL REMEDIES FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: RATIONALE, CASE
STUDIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 23 (1994).
Police and prosecutors often find it difficult to deal effectively with
hate crime in the criminal justice system. Evidence may be insufficient
to convict the perpetrator according to a standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt, often because victims and witnesses refuse to testify in hate crime
cases when they fear that repeated court appearances will expose them to
retaliation.
Id.
14 See Joan Comparet-Cassani, supra note 137, at 1200 (describing a case in which the
defendant's brother sat in the courtroom glaring at the witnesses which subsequently led the
witnesses to recant their earlier testimony and deny the statements they had given to police).
147 John Paul Serketich, supra note 140, at 233-34 (noting that "face-to-face confrontation
may inhibit the victim from pressing charges").
148 Algarin, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 981 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43).
I49 See id.
"o See id
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immediate answers." s5
Katharine E. O'Dette*
m5 Davis, 415 U.S. at 315-16 (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 123).
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